Survival, Willy Brandt had this to say to the international community:
We see a world in which poverty and hunger still prevail in many huge regions; in which resources are squandered without consideration of their renewal; and where a destructive capacity has been accumulated to blow up our planet several times over. [Hence this] . . . globalisation of dangers and challenges -war, chaos, self-destruction -calls for a domestic policy which goes much beyond parochial or even national items. Yet this is happening at a snail's pace. A rather defensive pragmatism still prevails, when what we need are IDS Bu/hijo, 1985 , vol 1600 . lxstitute of Deselopment Studies. Sussex new perspectives and bold leadership . . . The 'international community' is still too cut off from the experience of ordinary people and vice versa.
In spite of these warnings and many others like it, the snail's pace has become disorderly retreat. At the start of the 1980s the world economy slid into a new phase of recession, from which recovery is still uncertain. Furthermore, this deterioration and its effects on the developing countries could probably have been avoided, being 'explained in part by past policy choices as well as underlying economic and social conditions. In an interdependent world economy, growth in the developing countries is significantly affected by what happens in industrial countries'
Recession has coincided with a marked acceleration in the global arms race. After a period of decline (both in constant price values and relative to GNP) the military spending of the major Western powers, especially the United States, has increased sharply (Table 1) . Trends in the socialist bloc are less easy to discern because of' the absence of reliable official figures, though most sources are in agreement that steady increases have occurred in the Soviet Union [SIPRI 1985 [SIPRI : 2511 contrasting with the more cyclical behaviour of the United States. The deployment in Europe of Soviet These developments have reinforced a widening disparity between global power relations and trends in the international economy. The long run decline of the US economy relative to Europe, Japan and the NICs [analysed in more detail in two recent issues of the IDS Bulletin: IDS l985a and b], led to the breakdown of the 2 Bretton Woods system and ushered in a multipolar and altogether more anarchic international economic regime. In contrast, however, control over strategic relationships remains where it has been since the late 1940s -firmly in the hands of the superpowers.
Indeed this control has been further consolidated by the Cold War. It is epitomised in the current Geneva 'umbrella' negotiations between the USA and the Soviet Union. One interpretation of the Strategic Defence Initiative is that it is as much aimed at reasserting the US's global power as at changing the strategic relationship with the Soviet Union.
This disparity between a bipolar military order and a multipolar economic order has reinforced the superpowers' determination to maintain their strategic duopoly. In both the USA and the Soviet Union an interdependence has been established between the military and the non-military sectors of the economy through the respective mechanisms of a market and of a centrally-planned economy. In both, the military and military-related industries are almost the only lines of production in which they have managed to maintain a clear competitive edge. The temptation to sell arms and to use force directly in the Third World is arguably all the stronger.
In turn the transfer of East-West military rivalries to the Third World has affected North-South economic relationships. One place where this is visible is in the aid programmes of the major world powers. The previous trend from bilateral to multilateral assistance has been decisively reversed. As for the developing countries themselves, their military spending (see Table 2 ) has increased more or less continuously over the post-independence era, faster on the whole than that of the industrial North, although the increases tailed off in the early 1980s, when the full impact of the second and more severe phase of the recession made itself felt. The opportunity costs of military spending in terms of development and 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984 .n. 2 New debt is measured by net flows (disembursements minus amortisation) from the IMF's World Debt Tables, supplemented by 10% to cover the OECD's assumption that non-disclosed military debt is some 10% of total reported long-term debt.
For the interest-rates used in arriving at these figures see SIPRI [1985: 449] . .000- As for the developing countries themselves, their military expenditures have never (in spite of rapid growth) constituted more than a small fraction of the global total (see Table 2 ). Some comfort can be extracted from the fact that they have now ceased to rise. In any case, there has always been much diversity, with some countries (many of them oil exporters) devoting large shares of government revenue and GNP to military purposes and others relatively little.
The bulk of arms purchases have been heavily concentrated among a relatively small number of Third World recipients, many of them in the Middle East (Table 3 ). The determinants of arms transfers are too complex to be explained purely in terms of EastWest relations or the 'pushing' of arms by the suppliers (even though both are crucial). An illustration of this complexity is provided in Commissions, who adds that the winds of history were already turning against detente and the construction of a New International Economic Order when the reports were put before the public. All three, however, believe that the superpowers can still be iniluenced by political pressures and by appeals to their enlightened self interest. They support a multilateral approach, calling for a strengthening of the decision-making and peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations. And they argue that both disarmament and development remain very much on the UN agenda, pointing out that the debate over their relationship will continue -though perhaps in a lower key -at the 1986 UN Special Conference.
Next we come to two outside assessments. Some readers might think these criticisms rather harsh. The difficulties of moving from analysis to policy and from policy to practice are notorious.
Unlike the angel of history, the angel of policy sets his face so resolutely forward that he does not see the storms catching him from behind. The angel of politics (if there is one) is so busy trimming his wings to the winds that he cares not where they take him until he falls.
There is, however, no lack of concrete proposals in the reports which, after all, were the work of men and women who possess between them vast collective experience in the making of policy. In his article Willy Brandt suggests that Europe should play a more active role in bringing the superpowers to the negotiating The danger, however, with arguments that the Cold War and inequalities between North and South are so deeply entrenched in the international system that they will not respond to policy reforms such as those proposed in the Brandt, Palme and Thorsson reports, is that they can easily induce apathy: roll on the holocaust! Or they can lead, full circle, to a cynical conservatism: power politics is all that counts and the devil take the hindmost ! Any strategy for change must be able to identify the fault-lines as well as the 
